

## **CHALLENGES OF ANTI-PARLIAMENTARY POLITICAL CULTURE IN ARMENIA**

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Key words: Parliamentary political culture, political parties, parliamentary elections.

The current study addresses the fundamental issue of the development of parliamentary political culture in Armenia. It aims to raise the issue of strengthening the role of political parties in the renewal and further democratization of the state, conditioned by the internal and external political processes recently taking place in Armenia. Those are the transition to the parliamentary system of government (2015) and recently signed Agreement on Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership between EU and Armenia (2017). These political processes have a decisive role in the further democratization of the state. The new legal and political framework of state democratisation can be assessed not only as a shift of governance system but also is a shift to the new quality of parliamentary political culture that involves the parliament, political parties and the civil society, which are equally responsible for the formation of active political dialogue.

Nevertheless, it should be noted, that the new model of governance is going to be a challenge for currently operating political parties, as previously there were poor conditions for the development of the party system in Armenia. Moreover, in fact, currently, we can confidently stress, that Armenian multi-party system has exhausted itself. The state faces wide public distrust towards political parties, poor political participation and the absence of healthy and ideological competition between parties. In this context in order to clarify the causes and to suggest new approaches that partially can overcome the existing problems, there is a need to consider the features of the evolution of party system in Armenia and weaknesses of the current political-party landscape.

Political parties are indispensable for the functioning of modern parliamentary democracies. Due to the functions they have, political parties take the responsibility to provide the efficient performance of democratic governments. The parliamentary system of government relies on the collegiality of political power and governance. The main actors of parliamentary democracy are political parties, parliament and the government. Within a framework of parliamentary democracy during the formation of the last two (parliament and the government) political parties have a significant role as they are the only political channel through which people exercise their power.

In this context the definition, proposed by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yunhan Chu and Hung-mao Tien is apt: "Political parties remain important if not essential instruments for presenting political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands

and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective governments, and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process.” [Diamond, Plattner, Chu, Tien 1997: xxiii ].

Due to E.E. Schattschneider, “political parties created democracy, and modern democracy is unthinkable save except in terms of parties. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties is the best possible evidence of the nature of any regime.” [Schattschneider 2004: xxvii ]. To a certain extent, it is impossible to run a democracy without the help of political parties as they have quite a lot of important functions to the government. They are:

- . provision of two-way communication system between the government and public by contributing to the legitimacy of the political system,
- . articulation and aggregation of social interests,
- . integration of different new groups into political system and also the various interests into a general political project in order to form a political program,
- . promotion of political socialization and participation of citizens,
- . organization of parliament and government.

The importance of these functions is reflected not only in the thoughts and theories of well-known political scientists, but also in the framework of constitutional and legal regulation of the functioning of political parties. The international legislative framework for the protection of the rights of political parties is based, first of all, on the rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression and on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. These three principals were enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and subsequently became legally binding provisions of a number of international and regional instruments in the field of human rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms contain provisions that provide the rights and freedoms guaranteeing the free functioning of political parties. The constitutional and legal regulation of the functioning of political parties has a significant role in the framework of legal state, as it creates the representative basis in order to provide the efficient participation of civil society in the process of decision-making.

Every state has its own perception of the role and functioning of political parties, that is based on the traditions, historical memory, culture and political consciousness. For instance, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic gave France’s political parties constitutional position for the first time, but the role of those parties is limited to their participation in elections and does not extend as it does in Germany to an active contribution in political decision making. [Gabriel, Keil, Kerrouche 2013: 54-55] France does not have any specific legislation regarding political parties and the public funding

of parties has only been in place since 1988. In contrast, the legal status of political parties in Germany is not only laid down in Article 21<sup>1</sup> of the Basic Law, but also by the law on political parties<sup>2</sup> and election regulations.

Another tradition of regulating the role and functioning of political parties is formed in UK. The United Kingdom does not have one specific constitutional document named as such. Instead, the so-called constitution of the United Kingdom or British constitution, is a sum of laws and principles. This is sometimes referred to as an 'unwritten' or uncodified constitution. Besides that, UK, as well as France does not have any specific legislation regarding political parties. In UK political parties have a status of voluntary associations and are subjected to the general law, as well as to specific regulation. Due to the Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA)<sup>3</sup> there is a regulatory system that controls the registration, donations and expenditure of political parties.

It should be noted, that despite the fact that constitutional and legal framework of regulation of the functioning of political parties is important, unfortunately it's not a sufficient condition for the efficient performance of the parties in 'real politics.' Simultaneously, constitutional and legal framework of regulation of the functioning of political parties reflect of the level of development of constitutional and parliamentary political culture.

After the declaration of independence, political system representing typical self-centered tradition of political reproduction, was formed in Armenia. The foundation of such political system was rooted in 1991, when the presidential system was established and then was fixed in 1995 by the adoption of the Constitution.

The overestimation of the presidential system and the factual unlimited power have become the major barriers in the process of party system development. In the beginning, no matter how paradoxical it was, there was a social and political demand for the strengthening of the presidential system of government in Armenia. That was conditioned by the essence of some important factors, such as Nagorno-Karabakh military conflict (1988-1994), economic blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as by the transition into liberal-capitalism model, which brings an inequality of oppor-

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<sup>1</sup> Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (8 May of 1949). P. 27. <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Act on Political Parties (Political Parties Act; 24 July 1967) . Translated by the Translation Service of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. P. 3. <http://www.bundestag.de/blob/189734/2f4532b00e4071444a62f360416cac77/politicalparties-data.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (30<sup>th</sup> November 2000). Part II, PP. 17- 32 [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/pdfs/ukpga\\_20000041\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/pdfs/ukpga_20000041_en.pdf)

tunities within the society, the imperfection of the activities of political parties and the absence of statehood traditions, that have caused the need for a ‘strong hand’ within the state. That's why the president actually became the only viable and legitimate institution of the political system, concentrating in his hands unlimited authority, which had no constitutional and legal basis.

The strong-presidentialism that was criticized for establishing an authoritarian system in Armenia was changed into semi-presidentialism by the constitutional amendments in 2005. The aim of this constitutional amendments was ‘the formation of balance between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power, the security of their independence.’ However, unfortunately this change didn’t result in any actual transformation of the authoritarian system into a democratic one.

As a result of such circumstances, political parties had a poor participation in the process of public administration. That is the reason, that the parliament, as a supreme representative body, didn’t properly conduct its legislative and oversight functions. The same applies to the government. These developments inevitably led to the over-personalization of political life. Political parties couldn’t form the channel, through which people can express their will and their vision of state development. Instead of it, parties began to serve the personal aspirations of strong political individuals by failing in the process of party building.

The summary of the performance of political parties and their role in Armenian political reality will be best to present according to the well-known two mechanisms suggested by Miller and Stokes [Miller, Stokes 1963: 45-56], that ensure the responsiveness of such elected representatives. One of this mechanisms is the electoral process itself, which gives constituents the possibility to choose representatives that pledge policies in line with their own preferences. The other mechanism is between elections, the representatives’ actions in the legislature are connected with constituents through the formers’ perceptions of the preferences of the latter.

Since its Independence, six parliamentary elections were held in Armenia (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2012, 2017), the results of which are reflected in Table 1, besides the elections of 2017. The latter is considered separately in the framework of constitutional referendum.

Analyzing the data of political party participation in the elections, it should be noted that only Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and Armenian Republican Party (RPA) (in 1995 and in 1999 by coalition) participated in all parliamentary elections and overcame the 5% barrier defined by the law. As for Armenian Communist and National Democratic Union parties, they received deputy seats only in the First and the Second Convocation of National Assembly. Rule of Law (previously, from 2016-

2018 renamed Armenian Renaissance) party had stable representation since the Second Convocation, Prosperous Armenia (PAP) and People's Party since the Fourth Convocation (2007) of National Assembly. In general, we can state, that the party list of five convocations of National Assembly between elections was basically different. It is also noticeable, that the number of non-partisan deputies has gradually declined. It is also worth mentioning that between elections the Article 95 of Electoral Code (1999) periodically have been amended. According to it, from time to time the proportionality of the number of deputies elected by majoritarian and proportional electoral systems has been revised for the benefit of the latter. The amended Electoral Code received a positive response<sup>4</sup> from the Venice Commission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR). That was of course a necessary condition for the formation and development of multi-party system in Armenia. The number of parties, involved in the electoral process, also indicates the level of development of party system. So, in parliamentary elections of 1999, as well as in 2003, the number of political parties participated in the elections was 21, plus 1 coalition, in 2007 there were 23 political parties. Though, in parliamentary elections of 2012, the number of parties has dropped to 8.

The results of NA's five convocation elections reflect not only the positive but also the negative processes that took place in Armenia. Since its Independence, the most peaceful parliamentary elections were held in 2007. According to the final report<sup>5</sup> of OSCE/ODHIR, those elections demonstrated improvement and were conducted largely in accordance with OSCE commitments and their international standards for democratic elections. Simultaneously, the results of parliamentary elections of 2012 had the most negative impact on the index of the level of democracy. The variable of parliamentary majority calculated in the model reached the minimal sign, as the president's party gained an absolute majority assuming the authority of the sole decision-maker in legislative and executive bodies [Aleksanyan 2015: 38-53]. In this case, such a ratio of political forces almost exhausted the effectiveness of the constitutional referendum held on 2005, November 27 that aimed to limit the president's authority and to raise the role of the parliament in the government formation process.

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<sup>4</sup>[http://www.parliament.am/news.php?cat\\_id=2&NewsID=1903&year=2006%D0%B0%EF%BF%BD%20%D0%B0%20%D0%A2%EF%BF%BD%20=eng&month=06&day=13&lang=eng](http://www.parliament.am/news.php?cat_id=2&NewsID=1903&year=2006%D0%B0%EF%BF%BD%20%D0%B0%20%D0%A2%EF%BF%BD%20=eng&month=06&day=13&lang=eng)

<sup>5</sup> OSCE/ODHIR Election Observation Mission Report 12 May 2007: Parliamentary Elections. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/26606?download=true>

Table 1. Proportionality of Deputy Seats of RA Parliamentary Parties: 1995-2012

Parties, Coalitions, Non-partisan Candidates	RA Parliamentary Elections									
	1995		1999		2003		2007		2012	
	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P
‘Republic’ Union	68	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
‘Shamiram’	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Armenian Communist Party (ACP)	4	6	2	8	-	-	-	-	-	-
National Democratic Union	2	3	2	4	-	C	-	-	-	-
National Self-Determination Union	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Liberal Democratic Party	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)	1	-	3	5	-	11	-	16	1	5
‘Unity’ Coalition	-	-	33	29	-	-	-	-	-	-
‘Rule of Law’ (RLP)	-	-	2	4	7	12	2	8	1	5
‘Right and Unanimity’ Coalition	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Armenian Republican Party (RPA)	-	C	-	C	10	23	22	41	29	40
‘Justice’ Coalition	-	-	-	-	1	14	-	-	-	-
‘National Unanimity’	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-
United Labor Party	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-
Panarmenian Labor Party	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
‘Coalition’	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Armenian Prosperous Party (PAP)	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	18	9	28
‘Heritage’	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	5
Armenian National Congress (ANC)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
Vacant seats	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Partisan Candidates	72	-	32	-	37	-	9	-	1	-
Total	150	40	75	56	56	75	41	90	41	90

Source: the study based on the web-page of RA Electoral Commission

<http://www.elections.am/electionsview/>, accessed December 2017, the web-page of OSCE, OSCE/ODHIR Reports on RA Elections, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia>, accessed December 2017.

Currently, favorable factors for the democratization of the political system have been created in Armenia. On September 4 2013, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan has signed a decree<sup>6</sup> to establish a Specialized Commission on Constitutional Re-forms under the President’s office to draft amendments to the Armenian Constitution. According to the decree, the decision to implement constitutional reforms was conditioned by ‘the need for enforcing the principle of supremacy of right, improving the constitutional structures for ensuring fundamental human rights and freedoms, guaranteeing the full balance of powers and enhancing public administration effective-

<sup>6</sup>Decree of the President of RA to Launch a Process of Constitutional Amendments. Accessed: October 2017 <http://www.president.am/en/decrees/item/1197/>

ness<sup>7</sup>.’ Due to the report of Citizen Observer Initiative<sup>8</sup> on pre-referendum assessment, the President’s decision was estimated as a unilateral, as before, there have not been any expert debates or public discussions in Armenia on the need for constitutional changes. Instead, legal experts and human rights groups continuously have raised the concern of poor enforcement and gross violations of the Constitution by the state authorities. As for the position of the political forces on this issue, there were also diverse views here. The debate on the draft law by the MPs lasted only four days. Besides that, the final draft was submitted to the National Assembly only one hour before the vote. It is worth mentioning that the drafting of the constitutional amendments was implemented within two years, people had no more than two months to get acquainted with the draft constitutional amendments. A public discussion on the project was held in the National Assembly only one day. Below are presented the ‘for’ and ‘against’ positions of political forces regarding the implementation of constitutional amendments<sup>9</sup>. The Armenian National Congress (ANC), Heritage, Rule of Law (Orinats Yerkir), Free Democrats opposition political parties opposed to the constitutional amendments. They presented arguments such as ‘the consideration of deficiencies in the inner-political and economic system as a result of concrete system of government is an avoidance of responsibility from the authorities’, ‘the ruling party initiated this process to ensure its reproduction’, ‘we opposed, as the process was initiated by the ruling party’ and so on... In contrast to the above mentioned political parties, Prosperous Armenia (PAP) and Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnak-tsutyun) supported the constitutional amendments. Due to them, transition to a 100% proportional system will have a very positive impact on the development of the party system. They also stressed that if the semi-presidential system of governance can solve 4-5 problems from 15 facing the state, in the case of transition to a parliamentary system of government it will be possible to overcome 10-11 problems facing the state.

Thus, the two camps, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ were formed in the country ahead of the constitutional referendum. It is noteworthy that the ‘No’ camp also enjoyed the support of non-parliamentary parties (‘Founding Parliament’, ‘Liberty’, ‘People's Party of Armenia’, ‘Republic’) and civil society representatives (‘Stand up Armenia’, ‘No looting’, ‘Do not Hold’ civic initiatives, Union of Political Scientists of Armenia, ‘Armat’, ‘March 1’, ‘Freedom and Democracy’ NGOs). As a result of the ‘competitive’ demo-

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<sup>7</sup> Key: Constitutional Reforms: 2015. Accessed: October 2017.

<http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/parzabanum/13179/>

<sup>8</sup> Constitutional Referendum. Pre-referendum Assessment by Citizen Observer Initiative and European Platform for Democratic Elections. December 6, 2016. Accessed October 2017: [http://www.epde.org/tl\\_files/EPDE/EPDE%20PRESS%20RELEASES/Armenia%202015%20Report%20on%20Pre-referendum%20Camapign.pdf](http://www.epde.org/tl_files/EPDE/EPDE%20PRESS%20RELEASES/Armenia%202015%20Report%20on%20Pre-referendum%20Camapign.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> The Positions of Political Forces Regarding the Need of Implementation of Constitutional Reforms. 23.08.2013. Accessed October 2017: <https://www.civilnet.am/news/2013/175011>

cratic struggle between the two camps, the referendum on constitutional reforms, that was held on December 6, 2015, was adopted<sup>10</sup>, due to which Armenia is moving from the semi-presidential political system to parliamentary government.

It should be noted that the ‘No’ Camp, which was more popular in the whole process of constitutional changes, couldn’t present convincing arguments to prove its rightness and counterbalance the arguments presented by the ruling party. Moreover, by listening to their speeches and debates, it was clear that the oppositional political forces are not against the parliamentary system, but are against the ruling political force, which initiated the constitutional amendments. All this, of course, is the result of the inefficient role of the opposition as an essential constituent of a democratic political system. Due to Armenian political tradition, political parties start functioning at least 1 year before the elections and operate only at the personal level, very often engaging in a profitable deal with the ruling party (previously, it was Republican Party of Armenia, (HHK)) in order to get additional mandates. This of course does not lead to the institutionalisation of opposition political parties and the formation of an alternative political agenda. According to A. Panebianco, under the term ‘institutionalisation’, there is a need to understand “the way the organization ‘solidifies’ and slowly loses its character as a tool: it becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it. In this way, its preservation and survival become a ‘goal’ for a great number of its supporters.” [Panebianco 1988: 49]

The vivid proof of poor level of development of parliamentary political culture were parliamentary elections of 2017 that were held according to the newly adopted constitution, transforming the country from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. Despite the fact, that there are 87 officially registered<sup>11</sup> political parties in Armenia, only 9 political parties and blocs participated in parliamentary elections of 2017, the list of which is presented below.

Armenian Communist Party,  
Armenian Revolutionary Federation,  
Rule of Law Party ( from 2016-2018 renamed Armenian Renaissance Party)  
Coalition of Armenian National Congress and People’s Party of Armenia  
Free Democrats,  
Ohanyan-Raffi-Oskanyan (ORO) Alliance,  
Republican Party of Armenia (President Sargsyan’s Party),  
‘Tsarukyan’ Coalition,  
YELQ Alliance.

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
<sup>10</sup> The Results of the Constitutional Referendum of RA. 6.12.2015. Accessed October 2017: [http://res.elections.am/images/dec/15.99\\_A.pdf](http://res.elections.am/images/dec/15.99_A.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.e-register.am/am/search>



From above mentioned 9 political forces, only 4 are presented in the parliament, where the ruling party has an absolute majority gained through the formation of coalition with ARF and having such a pro-governmental ‘opposition’ in the face of ‘Tsarukyan’ Coalition. The elections were concluded by the outright victory of President Sargsyan’s Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), which won 49.17% of the votes and 58 seats out of 105 in the parliament. In addition to the RPA, ‘Tsarukyan’ Coalition, YELQ Alliance, and Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) gained 31, 9, and 7 seats, respectively, in the parliament.

**Table 2.** Proportionality of Deputy Seats of RA Parliamentary Parties After Parliamentary Elections of 2017



Source: the study based on the web-page of RA Electoral Commission, <http://www.elections.am/electionsview/> accessed 13.12.2017

With regard to the newly elected parliament, the view, that the transition to a parliamentary system of government would be the necessary condition for the development of a party system, which would ultimately form a balance between the parliament and the government, and the parliament in its turn would turn into a working body, full of diverse views and competitive political programs, is progressively becoming a myth. If we consider in comparative view the role of the government and the parliament in terms of shaping public policy, one can easily see that the government has the greatest degree of involvement.

In fact accountability is one of the bedrocks of representative government and its absence may indeed lead to long-term instability. But it should be noted that an effective governance relies not only on those in power but, almost as much on those who oppose and oversee them. Although, Armenian political party-landscape shows, that we can't speak about the effectiveness of governance, as in the result of recent parliamentary

elections, the Republican Party of Armenia has an absolute majority in the parliament. Despite the fact, that after the Velvet Revolution, YELQ alliance has become a ruling coalition, however in the parliament currently they have only 9 man-dates. In a newly-formed political reality when the Republican Party is no longer in power, in fact it has an absolute parliamentary majority and during the current political processes the former ruling party is presenting itself as an opposition. In this context there are two factors that have to be taken into account. First of all, do they have opposition's confidence vote in the case when they are rejected by society? Secondly, in such a situation how can we speak about the effective governance of ruling YELQ coalition: where is the counterbalance of real opposition forces?

If we consider the political party landscape before the Velvet Revolution, the main incentive of inefficient parliamentary governance was the political parties' allocation of seats. Taking into account the fact that "Tsarukyan" alliance was pro-governmental 'opposition' and YELQ alliance had and has only 9 mandates, we can't speak about the reliable public policy, effective oversight of the government's activities and so on... Opposition parties should have enough representatives to be effective and in a parliamentary system should be able to present a realistic alternative to the current government. The imbalance of the political parties' representation in the parliament reflects the imperfection of the electoral system. In order to understand the importance of the above mentioned, let's consider below the German electoral system as the existing electoral system has some similarity with the German electoral system. So, Bundestag elections are held according to a mixed two-stage electoral system. Half of the deputies are elected from one-mandate constituencies, and the other half by party lists. However, it is more acceptable to describe the German electoral system as a "personalized proportional electoral system". This option makes possible to form the "personal composition" of the Deputies.

According to the "personalized proportional electoral system", each citizen has two voting rights. Through the "first voice", the citizen elects the candidates representing the given constituency. In this way, half of the parliamentary mandates passed to the parliament (299) are distributed, and the remaining mandates are distributed according to the party lists (299). By means of "second voice", a citizen votes for this or that political party. The "second voice" determines the proportion of political parties in the parliament, ie the number of parliamentary mandates. Voting by party lists takes place in 16 multi-mandate constituencies. Each state of the federal state is a separate multi-mandate constituency from which a certain number of deputies are elected, according to the population of the given state. In each multi-mandate constituency, parties present separate party lists. In other words, each party participating in the elections represents 16 party lists. However, it is necessary to state that the "second voice" of the citizen is more

important than the first, since it forms the number of mandates of parties in the Bundestag. In the single-mandate constituencies, the majority system operates with a simple procedure. The deputy mandates, acquired in single-mandate constituencies, are called "direct mandates" (Direktmandate). The candidate in the single-mandate constituency is the candidate who has collected the maximum number of votes. In the single-mandate constituencies only after the calculation of the election results, the mandates of the other MPs are calculated according to the proportional system. Initially, the total number of votes collected by parties in the "second voice" is summed up, and then the total number of mandates of each party is counted. If, for example, the party has 100 mandates in the parliament and 40 of them have already been received by "direct mandates", then the party must be given the remaining 60 mandates. However, in a state where the party, according to "direct mandates", receives more votes than by party lists, the total number of deputies introduced in the Bundestag will increase accordingly. The minimum number of deputies represented in the Bundestag, according to the Basic Law, is 598<sup>12</sup>.

According to the existing Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia, the minimum number of deputies represented in the National Assembly, is 101<sup>13</sup> but unfortunately there are no defined mechanisms that are needed in order to balance the allocation of political parties' seats. The latter brings those tools and mechanisms that in terms of practical application can be regarded as powerful means in the hands of the opposition to form an alternative political agenda in order to counterbalance the ruling party. The necessity to form an alternative political agenda is based on the need to form an ideological program that should include a specific action plan of society's socialization and resocialization for all age groups.

As for the society, the political consciousness of the latter is highly politicized. Simultaneously citizens made a political decision on the basis of their social needs. Despite the massive antipathy against the former ruling political party within society, the atmosphere of distrust, the high level of poverty, unemployment and emigration, the number of voters was 1,575,786 or 60.95 percent<sup>14</sup>. It is noteworthy that in political reference sources in the case of such indicators of the domestic political situation there is a very low level of political participation. In that case what motivated citizens to participate in the parliamentary elections even triggering to Velvet Revolution? The question is open...

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<sup>12</sup> Federal Electoral Law: Version As Promulgated on 23 July 1993.  
[https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/dam/jcr/4ff317c1-041f-4ba7-bbbf-1e5dc45097b3/bundeswahlgesetz\\_engl.pdf](https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/dam/jcr/4ff317c1-041f-4ba7-bbbf-1e5dc45097b3/bundeswahlgesetz_engl.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia: Date of Acceptance- May 25, 2016.  
<http://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?docid=105967>

<sup>14</sup> <http://res.elections.am/images/doc/020417verj.pdf>

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**Մագդա ԱՐՍԵՆՅԱՆ**

**Հայաստանի հակախորհրդարանական քաղաքական մշակույթի մարտահրավերները**

*Բանալի բառեր. խորհրդարանական քաղաքական մշակույթ, քաղաքական կուսակցություններ, խորհրդարանական ընտրություններ*

Հոդվածում ներկայացված ուսումնասիրությունը քննության է առնում Հայաստանում խորհրդարանական քաղաքական մշակույթի զարգացման անհրաժեշտությունը: Այս համատեքստում հատկապես շեշտադրվում է քաղաքական կուսակցությունների դերակատարումը պետության ժողովրդավարավարացման գործում, ինչը պայմանավորված է երկրում տեղի ունեցող ներքին և արտաքին քաղաքական գործընթացներով: Հեղինակը ներկայացնում է կուսակցությունների գործունեության կարգավորման ոչ միայն տեսական և իրավական հիմքերն, այլև՝ վերլուծում է ընտրական գործընթացում և ընտրությունների միջև ընկած ժամանակահատվածներում կուսակցությունների քաղաքական վարքագիծը:

**Магда АРСЕНИЯН**

**Вызовы анти-парламентской политической культуры в Армении**

*Ключевые слова: парламентская политическая культура, парламентские выборы, политические партии*

В статье рассматривается необходимость развития парламентской политической культуры в Армении в контексте дальнейшей демократизации государства, что обусловлено происходящими в стране внутренними и внешними политическими процессами. Автор подчеркивает роль политических партий как главных акторов парламентской системы правления. В статье представлены не только теоретические и правовые основы регулирования деятельности политических партий, но и сделан анализ политического поведения политических партий в ходе избирательного процесса и выборов.